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Consequentialize This*
Campbell Brown
To ‘consequentialize’ is to take a putatively nonconsequentialist moral theory
and show that it is actually just another form of consequentialism. Some have
speculated that every moral theory can be consequentialized. If this were so,
then consequentialism would be empty; it would have no substantive content.
As I argue here, however, this is not so. Beginning with the core consequen-
tialist commitment to ‘maximizing the good’, I formulate a precise definition
of consequentialism and demonstrate that, given this definition, several sorts
of moral theory resist consequentialization. My strategy is to decompose con-
sequentialism into three conditions, which I call ‘agent neutrality’, ‘no moral
dilemmas’, and ‘dominance’, and then to exhibit some moral theories which
violate each of these.
I. INTRODUCTION
Arguing with a consequentialist can be frustrating. Witness a typical
sort of exchange: You—a nonconsequentialist, let’s assume—begin
with your favorite counterexample. You describe some action, a
judge’s convicting an innocent man to avert a riot, say, or a doctor’s
murdering a healthy patient for her organs, which, so you claim,
would clearly have the best consequences, yet equally clearly would
be greatly immoral. So consequentialism is false, you conclude; some-
times a person ought not to do what would have best consequences.
“Not so fast,” comes the consequentialist’s reply. “Your story pre-
supposes a certain account of what makes consequences better or
worse, a certain ‘theory of the good,’ as we consequentialists like to
say. Consequentialism, however, is not wedded to any such theory. We
already knew that combining consequentialism with some theories of
the good would have implausible results; that’s what utilitarianism has
* Of the many people with whom I have had helpful discussions on the topic of this
article, I remember the following: Selim Berker, Daniel Cohen, James Dreier, Andy Egan,
David McCarthy, Martin Peterson, Douglas W. Portmore, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Michael
Ridge, Michael Smith, and David Sobel. I thank them all, and also those I’ve forgotten.
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taught us. In order to reconcile consequentialism with the view that
this action you’ve described is wrong, we need only to find an appro-
priate theory of the good, one according to which the consequences
of this action would not be best. You say you’re concerned about the
guy’s rights? No worries; we’ll just build that into your theory of the
good. Then you can be a consequentialist too.”
And just like that, you’ve been assimilated. It’s a cunning ploy.
Instead of showing that your nonconsequentialism is mistaken, the
consequentialist shows that it’s not really nonconsequentialism; in-
stead of refuting your view, she ‘consequentializes’ it. If you can’t beat
’em, join ’em. Better still, make ’em join you.
One may suspect, however, that this consequentializing strategy,
if used in excess, will ultimately undermine consequentialism. It
might succeed in immunizing consequentialism against counterex-
amples only at the cost of severely weakening it, perhaps to the point
of utter triviality. So effortlessly is the strategy deployed that some are
led to speculate that it is without theoretical limits: every moral view
may be dressed up in consequentialist clothing.1 Take any theory tra-
ditionally thought of as opposed to consequentialism, and it will be
possible, they predict, to devise a consequentialist “counterpart the-
ory” which mimics perfectly the verdicts of the original regarding the
moral status of actions, whether they are right or wrong, permitted
or forbidden.2 If so, then consequentialism has something to offer
everyone. No matter your ethical persuasion, there’s a consequen-
tialist theory just right for you. But then, it seems, consequentialism
would be empty—trivial, vacuous, without substantive content, a mere
tautology. The statement that an action is right if and only if (iff) it
maximizes the good would entail nothing more substantive than the
statement that an action is right iff it is right; true perhaps, but not
of much use.
As I aim to show here, however, this speculation is mistaken.
There are in fact limits to consequentialization. Some views of right
and wrong are incompatible with consequentialism, no matter what
theory of the good one adopts. These views cannot be consequen-
tialized.
I’ll proceed as follows. In Section II, I’ll say more precisely what
consequentialization entails. This of course will involve saying more
1. Among ‘consequentializers’ who make this claim, or something close to it, may
be included James Dreier, “Structures of Normative Theories,” Monist 76 (1993): 22–40;
Jennie Louise, “Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella,” Philosophical Quar-
terly 54 (2004): 518–36; and Douglas W. Portmore, “Consequentializing Moral Theories,”
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2007): 39–73.
2. This notion of a ‘counterpart theory’ is taken from Louise, “Relativity of Value
and the Consequentialist Umbrella.”
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.194 on Thu, 16 Jan 2014 09:03:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Brown Consequentialize This 751
precisely what consequentialism is. My intention will not be to give
the one true, uniquely correct definition of consequentialism. Indeed,
I doubt there is any such thing; ‘consequentialism’ is a term of art
used by philosophers to mean different things on different occasions,
none of which is obviously most deserving of the name. Rather, my
approach will be to adopt the “best-case scenario” for the consequen-
tializer. I’ll try to define consequentialism in a way that makes con-
sequentialization as easy as possible. Then, in Section III, I’ll show
that, even given this favorable definition of consequentialism, the pro-
ject of consequentializing all theories cannot succeed. I’ll distinguish
three familiar sorts of moral theory which resist consequentialization.
II. HOW TO CONSEQUENTIALIZE
A. Maximizing the Good
As I say, my aim is to be as charitable to the consequentializer as I
can be. My charity must, however, have limits. Were I so generous as
to allow the consequentializer to mean anything at all she likes by
‘consequentialism’, then our question truly would be trivial. Thus, I
impose this minimal constraint: whatever is meant by ‘consequen-
tialism’, it must be intelligible as an elaboration of the familiar con-
sequentialist slogan “Maximize the good.” The non-negotiable core
of consequentialism, I shall assume, is the claim that an action is right,
or permissible, iff it maximizes the good. This is my starting point.
But what exactly does it mean? You might say: by ‘the good’ is
meant the class of all things good, the extension of the predicate
‘good’; so to maximize the good is to make as many good things as
possible. But this is implausible. Suppose you can either do x, pro-
ducing one good thing, or do y, producing two. Does it follow that
you will maximize the good by doing y? Not necessarily; for it might
be that the one thing is very good, yet the other two things only
moderately good, so that overall the one is more good than the other
two combined.
The problem with the first answer, you might say, is that it treats
being good as an all-or-nothing affair, when in fact it is more a matter
of degree. Not all good things are equally good; some are better than
others. This suggests another answer. To maximize the good is to
make things as good as possible, the best they can be. But how are
we to understand the extent to which things are good when there are
more things than one and they’re good to varying extents? Some pro-
cedure such as the following might seem to hold the answer. First,
partition the world into a set of mutually exclusive and jointly ex-
haustive things (to avoid double-counting). Then assign to each thing
in the partition a number representing the degree to which it is good.
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Finally, add up all the numbers. This sum will represent the extent
to which things are good overall.
Perhaps this procedure can be made to work. But it rests on a
controversial assumption, which the consequentialist need not accept.
This assumption, sometimes called ‘atomism’, is that when a whole is
composed of parts, the extent of goodness of the whole must equal
the sum of the extents of goodness of the parts (at least when the
parts are exclusive and exhaustive). This, of course, is just what G. E.
Moore warned us not to assume, and for good reason.3 Recall the
earlier example: doing x will produce one good thing; doing y will
produce two. But suppose now that each of the latter two things is,
considered by itself, better than the former. Does it follow that you
will maximize the good by doing y? Again, not necessarily; for it might
be that, although the two things are each better in isolation, when
combined, they are worse.
We should resist building atomism into consequentialism. In-
stead, I suggest, we should understand the extent to which things are
good, more holistically, as the extent to which the world as a whole
is good. As David Lewis puts it, “the way things are, at its most inclu-
sive, means the way this entire world is.”4 To maximize the good, then,
is to make the world, the sum of all things, as good as it can be; it is
to act so as to bring about the best possible world, of those which can
be brought about.5
More precisely, I’ll assume the following general picture. When
a person acts, she faces a range of alternatives, different actions she
might perform. For each action, I assume, there’s a unique possible
world that would obtain if the action were performed.6 We can call
this world the outcome of the action. In effect, the person faces a
choice between possible worlds. Each available action is the bringing
about of a possible world, its outcome the possible world thereby
brought about. Consequentialism then says an action is right iff its
outcome is best.
B. Some Clarifications
Before moving on, three points of clarification are in order. First,
consequentialism is here to be understood as a ‘criterion of right-
3. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), 28.
4. David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1986), 1.
5. Compare Fred Feldman, Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert: Essays in Moral Philos-
ophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 152.
6. This assumption is sometimes called ‘counterfactual determinism’; see, e.g., Krister
Bykvist, “Normative Supervenience and Consequentialism,” Utilitas 15 (2003): 27–49, at
30.
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ness’, as it’s commonly put, rather than as a ‘decision procedure’.7
That is, it need not recommend that agents aim directly at maximiz-
ing the good when deciding what to do. Plausibly, some outcomes,
for example, getting to sleep, are less well achieved by aiming directly
at them, and maximizing the good may be self-defeating in this way.8
In that case, consequentialism, as I’m thinking of it here, would rec-
ommend that agents decide what to do in some other way, for ex-
ample, by adopting “rules of thumb.”9
Second, consequentialism, as here understood, is a purely exten-
sional thesis. It claims only that, among possible actions, certain prop-
erties, namely those of being morally right and of maximizing the
good, are necessarily coinstantiated. It makes no claim of causation,
determination, or explanation; it doesn’t say that acts are right because
their outcomes are best. Nor (if this amounts to a distinct claim) does
it make a claim of priority; it doesn’t say that the good is prior to the
right.10 Sometimes it is objected that, while the extensional thesis may
be all right, consequentialism puts the cart before the horse in one
or other of these ways.11 Since, as I’ve said, I want to make things as
easy as possible for the consequentializer, I here understand conse-
quentialism extensionally, so such objections may be set aside.
Finally, since the outcome of an action is here assumed to be an
entire world, a person cannot in general know what the outcomes of
her actions will be. Even assuming there is a fact of the matter which
world would obtain should you act in a certain way, it’s exceedingly
unlikely that this fact would be accessible to you. Rather, in the nor-
mal case, you’ll have various partial beliefs regarding which worlds
might obtain conditional upon your action. In decision theory, such
beliefs are represented by ‘subjective probabilities’ which figure in
calculations of expected desirability. Thus, I’ll here be considering
only what is sometimes called objective rightness, which depends on
what in fact the outcomes of actions are, and not subjective rightness,
which depends on the variably probable outcomes of actions, as given
7. Compare Philip Pettit and Geoffrey Brennan, “Restrictive Consequentialism,” Aus-
tralasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1986): 438–55; David O. Brink, “Utilitarian Morality and
the Personal Point of View,” Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 417–38.
8. Compare Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984),
chap. 4.
9. Compare J. J. C. Smart, “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism,” Philosophical Quar-
terly 6 (1956): 344–54.
10. On the ‘priority of the good’, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971), 31.
11. See, e.g., Elizabeth Anderson, “Reasons, Attitudes, and Values: Replies to Sturgeon
and Piper,” Ethics 106 (1996): 538–54.
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by the agent’s subjective probabilities. This I do solely in the interest
of simplicity.
C. Theories of the Good
As Peter Railton explains, “one has not adopted any particular mo-
rality in adopting consequentialism unless one says what the good
is.”12 By itself, consequentialism is not a particular moral theory, but
it becomes one, or a part of one, when combined with a theory of
the good, a theory about which worlds are better or worse than which
others. There are many theories of the good with which it might be
combined; so there are many particular consequentialist theories.
These are unified in holding that we ought to maximize the good,
but divided over what the good is. Consequentialism is the collection
of all these particular theories taken together, the “genus,” we might
say, of which they are “species.”
The most famous and oldest of these species is surely utilitari-
anism, which results from combining consequentialism with a hedo-
nistic theory of the good. As contemporary consequentialists are
quick to point out, however, consequentialism is not limited to utili-
tarianism. There is, they say, a tendency to conflate the two, which
must be resisted, because it makes consequentialism appear in worse
shape than it really is. Once it is divorced from the crude, naive he-
donistic theory of the good, many common objections evaporate. Rail-
ton, for example, gestures at a ‘pluralistic’ theory of the good in
which “several goods are viewed as intrinsically nonmorally valuable
—such as happiness, knowledge, purposeful activity, autonomy, soli-
darity, respect, and beauty.”13 Such a theory, he argues, enables the
consequentialist to escape the problems of ‘alienation’ that beset util-
itarianism.
This flexibility of consequentialism opens the door to conse-
quentialization. It raises the possibility that, by careful selection of an
appropriate theory of the good, even the most adamant opponents
of consequentialism may be brought under what Jenny Louise calls
“the consequentialist umbrella.”14 James Dreier describes the strategy:
“The main strategy for ‘consequentializing’ any given moral theory is
simple. We merely take the features of an action that the theory con-
siders to be relevant, and build them into the consequences. For ex-
ample, if a theory says that promises are not to be broken, then we
12. Peter Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 13 (1984): 134–71, at 148.
13. Ibid., 149.
14. Louise, “Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella”; cf. the “conse-
quentialist vacuum cleaner” in David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, “Agent-Relativity
and the Doing-Happening Distinction,” Philosophical Studies 63 (1991): 167–85.
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restate this requirement: that a promise has been broken is a bad
consequence. Notice that the weighting is not yet specified. If the the-
ory under consideration includes an absolute side constraint against
promise-breaking, then we have the consequentialist version give a lex-
ically prior negative weight to promise-breaking.”15
It will be helpful to describe the strategy more precisely. Let M
be any moral theory which we aim to consequentialize. And let C be
consequentialism. So a particular consequentialist theory is equivalent
to some conjunction C&G, where G is a theory of the good. Say that
the deontic output of a theory P is the set of all propositions about the
rightness or wrongness of actions which are entailed by P ; and say P
and Q are deontically equivalent iff they have the same deontic out-
put.16 Then to consequentialize M, we simply find some theory of the
good G such that M is deontically equivalent to the particular con-
sequentialist theory C&G. We might then call C&G a consequentialist
counterpart of M.
But why, you might ask, should we think that this process of con-
structing a consequentialist counterpart for M amounts to the same
thing as consequentializing it? Consider an analogy. Suppose I employ
you to paint my red house blue, and you then proceed to build an-
other house which is a perfect replica of mine except it’s painted
blue rather than red. Then you haven’t done your job. The new house
may be blue, but it’s not my house. You haven’t done anything to my
house; it’s still red. Creating a blue counterpart of my house is not a
way of making my house blue. Likewise, you might say, creating a
consequentialist counterpart of M is not a way of making M a con-
sequentialist theory. The counterpart theory, C&G, may be conse-
quentialist, but that’s a different theory; C&G is not M. Of course,
the two theories do agree on all deontic questions, about which ac-
tions are right or wrong; by hypothesis, they’re deontically equivalent.
But they needn’t agree on questions of the good, because M need
not imply G, the theory of the good which is implied by C&G.
D. ‘The Good’ as a Theoretical Term
To solve this problem, I suggest, the consequentializer needs to adopt
a certain semantic thesis, about the meaning of the term ‘the good’
in consequentialism. They need to understand ‘the good’ as a theo-
retical term.
By a theoretical term, I mean a term which is introduced by a
theory, in this case consequentialism, as a name for something whose
15. Dreier, “Structures of Normative Theories,” 23.
16. Compare the “Deontic Equivalence Thesis” in Portmore, “Consequentializing
Moral Theories.”
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existence the theory postulates.17 As an analogy, consider so-called
‘phlogiston theory’. In the eighteenth century, chemists theorized
that all combustible bodies contained a substance that was released
in combustion, and they introduced ‘phlogiston’ as a name for the
substance so postulated. As we all know, the theory turned out to be
false. It was refuted by the discovery that in fact nothing is released
by combustion; there is no such thing as phlogiston. But the theory
was immune to refutation in another way: it could not have been
refuted by showing that something other than phlogiston was released
in combustion. Since ‘phlogiston’ is a theoretical term introduced by
phlogiston theory, it names anything, if there is anything, which has
all the properties attributed to phlogiston by this theory. Were there
to exist anything with these properties, then that thing, by definition,
would be phlogiston. (For now I ignore the possibility of multiple
realizations. If it had turned out that more than one substance was
given off in combustion, then phlogiston theory might also have been
refuted.)
My suggestion, then, is that the consequentializer treats ‘the
good’ as a theoretical term introduced by consequentialism, in the
same way that ‘phlogiston’ was introduced by phlogiston theory. That
is, ‘the good’ names the thing, if there is one, which has the prop-
erties attributed to the good by consequentialism. The good is thus,
by definition, that which ought to be maximized.
Actually, this definition is a bit loose. Normally, to say that a per-
son ought to do something is to say only that her doing it is necessary,
though perhaps not sufficient, for her to act rightly. One ought to
keep to the left side of the road when driving in Britain; but that is
not to say that every motorist driving on the left—including the guy
driving at twice the legal speed limit while texting on his cell phone
—is acting rightly. But we wouldn’t want to define ‘the good’ as: that
thing the maximization of which is necessary for acting rightly. We
already know there is no such thing. Rather, there are many. For ex-
ample: maximizing the number of integers. Every action maximizes
this (no action results in there being fewer integers than there would
have been otherwise); so, a fortiori, every right action maximizes this.
And the same goes for, say, maximizing the number of prime integers;
and so on. We must therefore define ‘the good’ instead as: that thing
the maximization of which is both necessary and sufficient for acting
rightly. That being a bit of a mouthful, however, I’ll continue using
‘that which ought to be maximized’, as a sort of shorthand.
The analogy is perhaps not perfect. In the case of phlogiston
17. Compare David Lewis, “How to Define Theoretical Terms,” Journal of Philosophy
67 (1970): 427–46.
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theory, the term ‘phlogiston’ was not used, as we might say, ‘outside’
the theory. Proponents of the theory coined this term for their own
theoretical purposes. However, the term ‘the good’ is used outside
consequentialism. But this is no problem. We can think of other cases
where an ordinary word is co-opted and, by stipulation, given a purely
theoretical meaning. Think of ‘string’ and string theory, or, closer to
home, ‘utility’ and utility theory. In treating ‘the good’ as a theoretical
term, in the way I’ve suggested, we are giving it a stipulated meaning,
which need not be the same as its meaning is in ordinary language.
Some might object that this results in an illegitimate definition of
consequentialism. A proper definition, they might say, must use the
term ‘the good’ as we ordinarily use it.18 If so, that would be bad news
for consequentializers. But, as I’ve said, I want to make things as easy
for them as I can. Hence I’ll allow them to stipulate the meaning of
‘the good’ in this way.
How does this help the consequentializer? Recall the moral the-
ory M and its consequentialist counterpart C&G. Let ‘the good G’
denote whatever is the good according G. As we know, an action is
right according to M iff it is right according to C&G. And an action
is right according to C&G iff it maximizes the good G. Therefore, an
action is right according to M iff it maximizes the good G. That is, M
implies that the good G (and nothing else) ought to be maximized.
Given our semantic thesis, M thus implies that the good G is the good.
So the consequentialization of M is now complete; it has been shown
to be a consequentialist theory.
E. The ‘The’
You might worry that our semantic thesis has already made conse-
quentialism a mere tautology (or at any rate, analytically equivalent
to one). Consequentialism states that the good ought to be maxi-
mized, where ‘the good’ is defined as the thing which ought to be
maximized. If we substitute definiens for definiendum, we thus end
up with the trivial-sounding statement “The thing which ought to be
maximized ought to be maximized.” However, while this may seem
vacuously true, in fact it isn’t. Recall phlogiston theory, which states
that phlogiston is released by combustion. Substituting definiens for
definiendum as before yields: “The thing which is released by com-
bustion is released by combustion.” This, too, may sound vacuously
true. But we know it isn’t, because we know it isn’t true. And we know
why: because nothing is released by combustion.
The presence of the definite article “The” is crucial here. If the
18. Compare Mark Schroeder, “Teleogy, Agent-Relative Value, and ‘Good,’” Ethics 117
(2007): 265–95.
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statement were “Anything which ought to maximized ought to be
maximized,” then it truly would be trivial; but that’s a different, non-
equivalent statement. Without getting into controversial details in the
philosophy of definite descriptions, we can I think safely make the
following two assumptions. First, a sentence of the form “The F is G”
is true iff the definite description “The F” denotes something which
is G. Second, a thing is denoted by “The F” iff it, and only it, is F. It
follows that a sentence of the form “The F is F” is true iff exactly one
thing is F. So the sentence “The thing which ought to be maximized
ought to be maximized” is true iff exactly one thing ought to be max-
imized.
Thus, there remains a way for a moral theory to resist conse-
quentialization: by implying that nothing ought to be maximized. (And
there’s another way: by implying more than one thing ought to be
maximized.) As I’ll argue, some familiar moral theories do resist con-
sequentialization in this way.
III. THE LIMITS OF CONSEQUENTIALIZATION
A. Formal Model
I begin by defining a simple formal model. The model will take en-
tities of two sorts as primitives: possible worlds and agents. By ‘possible
worlds’, I mean, in the usual way, complete ways the world might be.
And by ‘agents’, I mean creatures capable of actions apt for moral
evaluation. A ‘choice situation’, I’ll say, is an ordered pair , whereAi, AS
i is an agent and A is a finite, nonempty set of worlds. (I shall briefly
discuss relaxing the assumption of finiteness, made here mainly for
simplicity, in Sec. III.B.3.) These worlds are the alternatives between
which the agent i must choose, the outcomes of the various actions
which she might perform in this situation.
I shall assume that every such ordered pair constitutes a choice
situation. Admittedly, this is unrealistic. There are worlds you could
never be in a position to choose, for example, worlds you don’t exist
in. You might choose to cease existing, but you could not possibly
choose never to have existed in the first place (by the time you make
the choice, it’s already too late—you exist). There is nonetheless, I
think, some sense to be made of ethical questions about such impos-
sible choices. Would your choosing never to have existed be wrong?
That question seems not entirely incomprehensible. Still, I should
confess, this may be one place where I am being less charitable to the
consequentializer than I could be. Suppose we were to confine atten-
tion to realistic choice situations, those where the alternatives in A
are all worlds which the agent i could possibly choose. Then there
may be no overlap between the alternatives in choice situations in-
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volving different agents, for it could be that any world I could possibly
choose is not one you could possibly choose, and vice versa. And in
that case, the condition which I call below ‘Agent Neutrality’ would
have no bite, for reasons that will become apparent. So I acknowledge
that constraining what counts as a choice situation may be another
avenue to consequentialization, though not one I will pursue here.
What I earlier called the ‘deontic output’ of a moral theory will
then be represented by a ‘rightness function’ R which assigns to each
choice situation a subset of A. I shall write “ ” to denote thisAi, AS R (A)i
subset. The worlds in are the alternatives which are right (per-R (A)i
mitted) in the situation , according to the moral theory repre-Ai, AS
sented; the worlds in , that is, those in A but not in , areA\R (A) R (A)i i
the alternatives which are wrong (forbidden).
A theory of the good will be represented by a complete order ≤
on the set of all possible worlds, or as I shall say, for short, a ‘complete
world order’. Where x ≤ y, this represents that y is at least as good
as x, according to this theory of the good. By ‘order’ I mean a binary
relation that satisfies two conditions: reflexivity (x ≤ x), and transi-
tivity (if x ≤ y and y ≤ z, then x ≤ z).19 By ‘complete order’ I mean
an order which satisfies in addition a third condition: completeness
(either x ≤ y or y ≤ x). For now, completeness is a useful simplifying
assumption. I’ll discuss relaxing it below (Secs. III.C.1 and III.D.5).
If ≤ is an order on S, and X is a subset of S, then we may define
the set of ‘greatest elements’ in X, relative to ≤ , as the set:
grt (X )p {x:x  X and for all y, if y  X then y ≤ x}.≤
That is, the greatest elements are those which are at least as great
as every element. (Note, I say ‘greatest elements’, not ‘maximal ele-
ments’; this distinction will be important below, in Sec. III.C.1.)
We may then say that a rightness function R ‘maximizes’ a world
order ≤ iff in every choice situation, R selects all and only the
greatest alternatives relative to ≤ ; that is, for all i and A, R (A)pi
.grt (A)≤
Finally, consequentialism may be defined as follows.
Consequentialism (C). R maximizes exactly one complete world
order ≤ .
A moral theory is consequentialistic iff it is represented by a right-
ness function R which satisfies C.20
It can be shown that no rightness function maximizes more than
19. Strictly, I should say ‘preorder’.
20. This is similar to the definition of ‘teleology’ in John Broome, Weighing Lives
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 10–16.
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one world order.21 So C says in effect that R maximizes at least one
There are some rightness functions which do not satisfy this con-≤ .
dition. These represent moral theories which cannot be consequen-
tialized. Which ones are they? To give a clearer idea of this, it will be
helpful to state three further conditions (for simplicity, I’ll leave quan-
tification implicit):
Agent Neutrality (AN). .R (A)p R (A)i j
No Moral Dilemmas (NMD). .R (A)(Mi
Dominance (D). Suppose , , and{x, y}P A∩ B x  R (A) y i
. Then .R (A) y  R (B)i i
C is equivalent to the conjunction of AN, NMD, and D (for proof,
see the appendix, proposition 1). Thus, we may distinguish three sorts
of moral theory which can’t be consequentialized, corresponding to
the three conditions. I’ll consider each of these in turn.
B. Agent Neutrality
Utilitarianism has well-documented difficulties with people’s rights.
As anyone who has ever been near an ethics class will tell you, it’s not
hard to concoct scenarios in which achieving the greatest total hap-
piness would require violating some poor individual’s rights, for ex-
ample, by denying them a fair trial, or by exploding them with dy-
namite to clear the opening of a cave they are obstructing. The
consequentialist who rejects utilitarianism may attempt to overcome
such difficulties by accounting for violations of rights in their theory
of the good. They may say that worlds in which rights are violated are
worse than worlds in which rights are not violated, at least other
things being equal. This would be to adopt what Robert Nozick calls
a “utilitarianism of rights,” wherein “violations of rights (to be mini-
mized) merely would replace the total happiness as the relevant end
state in the utilitarian structure.”22
However, as Nozick points out, this approach fails to capture what
many feel is a crucial aspect of the moral significance of rights,
namely, that rights act as ‘side constraints’ against our pursuit of the
good. They are such that you ought not to violate them, even in cir-
cumstances where your doing so would result in fewer violations over-
all.23 Suppose that unless you kill one innocent person, thereby vio-
lating one right, someone else will kill two innocent people, thereby
violating two. The view of rights as side-constraints says that you
shouldn’t kill the person, yet Nozick’s utilitarianism of rights says you
21. Suppose and ∼ . Then R maximizes only if , and Rx ≤ y x ≤ y ≤ y  R ({x, y})1 2 1 i
maximizes only if . So R cannot maximize both and .≤ y  R ({x, y}) ≤ ≤2 i 1 2
22. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 28.
23. Ibid., 29.
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should, since this would minimize the total number of rights viola-
tions overall.
This side-constraint rights theory is an example of what are some-
times called agent-relative, or agent-centered, theories.24 As usually
defined, a theory is agent-relative iff it gives different aims to different
agents; otherwise it’s agent-neutral. Thus, for example, the side-con-
straint rights theory gives me the aim of seeing to it that I don’t violate
any rights, but gives you the aim of seeing to it that you don’t violate
rights. For another example, some moral theories say that agents have
a special obligation to promote the well-being of their own family and
friends, over and above the obligation they have to promote the well-
being of people generally.25 In contrast, utilitarianism is agent-neutral,
because it gives everyone the same aim: maximizing total happiness.
Unsurprisingly, if R represents an agent-relative theory, then it
violates the condition AN. Suppose R represents the side-constraint
rights theory. And let the worlds and be such that in youw w wm y m
violate some right and I violate none, but in I violate some rightwy
and you violate none. (Surely there are such worlds.) Since the theory
says I ought to choose over , and you ought to choose overw w wm y y
, we have and . And thisw R ({w , w }) p {w } R ({w , w }) p {w }m me m y m you m y y
plainly violates AN, because by hypothesis . So this theory re-w ( wm y
sists consequentialization, as do all agent-relative theories.
1. Agent-relative value.—This result might be thought to reveal a cer-
tain limitation of our formal model. A popular strategy for consequen-
tializing agent-relative theories involves devising agent-relative theo-
ries of the good, theories according to which what’s good relative to
one person need not be good relative to another. But the model
doesn’t allow the good to be agent-relative in this way.
It might seem that such a strategy is incompatible with the idea
of maximizing the good. On this approach, one might say, there is not
a single thing—the good—which every agent ought to maximize;
rather there are many things—the good relative to me, the good rel-
ative to you, and so on—and each agent ought to maximize a differ-
ent one. Perhaps, however, this can be thought of in another way.
What differs from person to person, one might say, is not what the
person ought to maximize, but rather how the person maximizes it;
we all ought to maximize the same thing—the good relative to the
agent—but we each do so in our own way. Here’s an analogy.26 Sup-
pose you and I are competing in a race. Then, in one manner of
24. See, e.g., Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 27.
25. See, e.g., Michael Smith, “Immodest Consequentialism and Character,” Utilitas 13
(2001): 173–94.
26. As I recall, this example was first suggested to me by Michael Smith.
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speaking, you and I have the same goal: winning the race. But what
would make it the case that I achieve this goal, that is, my crossing
the finish line before you, is not what would make it the case that
you achieve it, that is, your crossing before me. There is a single thing,
winning the race, which we both aim to achieve, but we each achieve
it (if we do) in our own way: you by your winning, and me by my
winning. Similarly, one might say, in the case of the rights theory,
there is a single thing, respecting rights, which we both ought to max-
imize, but we each maximize it (if we do) in our own way: you by
your respecting rights, and me by my respecting rights.
How might this sort of view be represented formally? The obvious
approach, I think, is to borrow a familiar formal device for repre-
senting what is sometimes called ‘indexical content’, namely, the de-
vice of centered worlds.27 Suppose you and I each utter the sentence
“I have a beard.” Some hold the view that our utterances express a
common content. But that content cannot be a proposition, at least
not in the sense of a set of possible worlds, because the worlds in
which you have a beard do not perfectly overlap those in which I do.
Rather, on this approach, the content is a set of centered worlds: the
set of every world-individual pair such that i has a beard in w.Aw, i S
Thus, we might represent an agent-relative theory of good, not
by an order of worlds (as above), but rather by an order of centered
worlds. For example, a theory that values respecting rights (and noth-
ing else) would be represented by an order ≤ such that Ax, i S ≤
iff the number of rights violated by i in x is no less than theAy, j S
number violated by j in y. Then the greatest elements in a set of
worlds A would be defined, now doubly indexed to an order ≤ and
an agent i, as follows:
grt (X )p {x:x  X and for all y, if y  X then y, i ≤ x, i }.G H G H≤ ,i
A rightness function R would be defined as maximizing a world order
≤ iff, for all i and A, . Finally, consequentialismR (A)p grt (A)i ≤ ,i
would say, as before, that R maximizes exactly one ≤ .
This would get us part of what we wanted: some rightness func-
tions which violate AN nonetheless maximize centered world orders.
The problem, however, is that if R maximizes one, then it maximizes
many; it cannot maximize exactly one. Thus, our reformulated con-
sequentialism, far from being trivially true, is trivially false, self-con-
tradictory. (For proof, see the appendix, proposition 2.) Roughly, the
reason is this. If the centered worlds and are centered onAx, i S Ay, j S
different people (i.e., if ), then they make no difference toi( j
27. See, e.g., David Lewis, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se,” Philosophical Review 88
(1979): 513–43.
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whether R maximizes ≤ . That is, if is the same as ≤ except for′≤
the relative positions of these centered worlds, then R maximizes ≤
iff it maximizes . So R cannot maximize only one order.′≤
This way of trying to accommodate agent-relative theories within
consequentialism therefore fails. To be clear, I do not claim that
agent-relative views are incoherent. I claim only that they are incom-
patible with the view that there is a single thing, the good, that we all
ought to maximize. Such views are better thought of as the saying
that there are many things that ought to be maximized, a different
one for each of us.
C. No Moral Dilemmas
By a moral dilemma, I mean a situation in which a person cannot avoid
acting wrongly. In our formal model, a choice situation consti-Ai, AS
tutes such a dilemma, according to a rightness function R, iff R (A)i
is the empty set. Moral dilemmas have been widely discussed by phi-
losophers, some of whom believe they are possible. Moreover, the
possibility of moral dilemmas seems to be entailed by familiar moral
theories, which might be called absolutist theories, since they incorpo-
rate absolute prohibitions. Consider, for example, a theory which
holds that violations of rights are absolutely morally forbidden; it is
always wrong in any possible situation to violate a right. Suppose,
further, that the catalog of rights endorsed by this theory is such that
sometimes a person cannot help but violate at least one right. Then
this theory cannot be represented by a rightness function which sat-
isfies NMD, and so it cannot be consequentialized.
1. Going incomplete.—Again, this might be thought to show a limi-
tation of our formal model. In our model, the good must be repre-
sented by a complete order. In effect, this rules out incommensurability.
That is, it implies that for any two worlds, either one is better than
the other, or they are equally good. Suppose, then, we were to relax
this requirement and allow the good to be represented by an incom-
plete, or partial, order. If ≤ is incomplete, then there is at least one
set of worlds A with no greatest elements relative to ≤ ; that is,
. Thus, a rightness function which violates NMD, thoughgrt (A)pM≤
it cannot maximize any complete order, might nonetheless maximize
an incomplete one (and, as before, it cannot maximize more than
one). Dropping the assumption of completeness would therefore al-
low moral dilemmas within consequentialism.
However, if we allow the good to be incomplete in this way, then
we should, I think, revise our definition of maximization. We should
define this, not in terms of greatest elements, as above, but rather in
terms of maximal elements. The maximal elements in a set X, relative
to an order ≤ , may be defined as follows:
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max (X )p {x:x  X and for all y,≤
if y  X, and x ≤ y then y ≤ x}.
(See Sec. III.A for the definition of greatest elements.) Thus, an
element is maximal iff it is at least as great as every element that is at
least as great as it. If ≤ is complete, then , and somax (X )p grt (X )≤ ≤
it didn’t matter before whether maximization was defined in terms of
greatest or maximal elements. But if ≤ is incomplete, then grt (X )≤
may be a proper subset of . Every greatest element must bemax (X )≤
maximal, but the converse need not hold. So long as X is finite,
is nonempty. Defining maximization in terms of maximal el-max (X )≤
ements, as I think we should, would therefore again make consequen-
tialism incompatible with moral dilemmas, regardless of whether the
good is complete.28
Here is my argument for defining maximization in terms of max-
imal elements. Suppose that, having promised to show you “one of
the most impressive sights in Great Britain,” I take you to see Salisbury
Cathedral.29 Were you later to learn of some more impressive sight in
Britain, you would then be entitled to complain that I had not ful-
filled my promise. (There are of course contexts in which one can
say of a sight which is only, say, the fifth most impressive in Britain
that it is “one of the most impressive.” But that would be speaking a
little loosely, like saying, e.g., that someone is “at the front of the
queue” when in fact there are several people in front of her. Assume
then that when I gave my promise, I made it clear that I was speaking
quite strictly; e.g., I said that the sight I would show you was “one of
the very most impressive,” that it was “unsurpassed” or “second to
none” in its impressiveness.) Suppose what you learn, however, is only
that, though no sight in Britain is more impressive than Salisbury
Cathedral, there is one sight, Stonehenge, such that Salisbury Cathe-
dral is not at least as impressive as it. Then surely you have no such
complaint. You might ask: “If Salisbury Cathedral is not at least as
impressive as Stonehenge, then why did you not take me to see Sto-
nehenge instead?” But then I could easily answer this challenge by
saying: “Because Stonehenge is not more impressive than Salisbury
Cathedral.”
This suggests the following general principle: if an F is not one
of the most G F s, then some F is more G than it. (For example, sub-
stituting “puppy” and “cute” for “F ” and “G,” respectively, yields this
28. The definition would be this: R maximizes ≤ iff for all i andR (A)p max (A)i ≤
A.
29. This example was inspired by John Broome, “Is Incommensurability Vagueness?”
in Ethics out of Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 123–44.
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instance of the principle: if a puppy is not one of the most cute pup-
pies, then some puppy is more cute than it.) And this implies that in
any choice situation, any alternative that is not worse than any other
alternative is one of the best alternatives. But an alternative that is
not less great than any other, relative to an incomplete order, might
nonetheless fail to be a greatest alternative relative to that order
(though it must be maximal; recall we’re assuming A must be finite).
Thus, if maximization were defined in terms of greatest elements,
consequentialism would allow that an alternative might be wrong even
though it is one of the best. And that, it seems to me, is something
that consequentialism cannot allow. Consequentialism must say at
least this much: if an alternative is one of the best, then it is permis-
sible.
Interestingly, however, if we allow incompleteness and define max-
imization in terms of maximal elements, then, though consequen-
tialism would still imply NMD, it would fail to imply another of the
three conditions, namely, D. I shall return to this in Section III.D.5.
2. Infinitely many alternatives.—Another way to accommodate moral
dilemmas within consequentialism would be to drop the assumption
that all choice situations involve only finitely many alternatives. If A
is infinite, then even may be empty. However, moral theoriesmax (A)≤
which imply dilemmas in finite cases would still elude consequen-
tialization.
D. Dominance
Condition D may be the least intuitive of the three. It requires the
following. Suppose that in a given choice situation, two worlds x and
y are among the alternatives. And suppose in this situation, x is right
and y wrong. Then x dominates y in the following sense: y cannot be
right in any situation where x is an alternative; the presence of x is
always sufficient to make y wrong.
I’ll discuss three sorts of D-violating moral theory.
1. Satisficing.—One place to look for such theories is with those that
relax the maximizing element in consequentialism. To some, it has
seemed that accepting nothing less than the best, as consequentialists
do, is too demanding. They believe it’s sometimes okay to do some-
thing which is worse than the best, provided it’s not too much worse.
Theories which are less demanding in this way are sometimes called
satisficing theories, the idea being that ‘satisficing’ is a more tolerant
version of maximizing.30
It will be useful to discuss a particular (made up) satisficing the-
30. See, e.g., Michael Slote, Common Sense Morality and Consequentialism (London:
Routledge, 1985).
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ory. Consider then ‘satisficing utilitarianism’, defined as follows: an
alternative x is right iff the total well-being in x is at least as great as
0.8 times the total well-being in every alternative. Suppose there are
two choice situations as shown in the following table.
Situation 1 Situation 2
Worlds Well-being Worlds Well-being
w1 100 w1 100
w 2 80 w 2 80
w 3 120 w 4 60
In each situation, there are three alternatives, two of which— andw1
—are available in both. The difference is that , which is availablew w2 3
in the first situation, is replaced by in the second. The numbersw 4
in the “Well-being” columns represent the total well-being in each of
the worlds. Suppose R represents satisficing utilitarianism. Then we
have:
R ({w , w , w }) p {w , w }i 1 2 3 1 3
R ({w , w , w }) p {w , w }.i 1 2 4 1 2
But then R cannot satisfy D. If it did, then since is wrong in thew 2
first situation, where is present and not wrong, would be dom-w w1 2
inated by , and so it couldn’t be right in the second situation, wherew1
is also present. Thus, satisficing utilitarianism cannot be conse-w1
quentialized.
According to satisficing theories, then, there is no such thing as
the good. This might seem a puzzling conclusion. Think of the way
we would normally describe the difference between satisficing utili-
tarianism and regular utilitarianism. These two theories, we would say,
share a common theory of the good: they both say that the goodness
of a world is given by the total well-being it contains. Their difference
is over how we should “respond” to the good: roughly, whereas reg-
ular utilitarianism says we must maximize the good, satisficing utili-
tarianism says it’s okay if we merely satisfice it. However, our conclu-
sion entails quite a different picture. The two theories disagree about
the good: whereas regular utilitarianism says there is such a thing as
the good, satisficing utilitarianism says there is no such thing.
But the puzzle is easily resolved if we bear in mind the definition
of ‘the good’ we’ve been assuming. On this definition, ‘the good’
names the thing, if there is one, which ought to be maximized. Ob-
viously, when proponents of satisficing theories say something like “It
is sometimes permissible not to maximize the good,” they cannot
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mean ‘the good’ in this sense; that would be incoherent. They must
mean it in some other sense.
2. Self and other.—A second theory which violates D is so-called ‘self-
other utilitarianism’, as proposed by Ted Sider.31 The rationale for
this view is to allow people to sacrifice their own well-being in certain
situations where this wouldn’t be allowed by ordinary utilitarianism.
It may be defined as follows: an alternative x is right iff either (1) the
total well-being of all people is at least as great in x as in every alter-
native, or (2) the total well-being of all people excluding the agent,
i, is at least as great in x as in every alternative.
To see how this violates D, consider three worlds that contain
only two people, i and j, as given in the following table:
Well-being
Worlds i j
w1 1 1
w 2 0 1
w 3 1 0
Suppose first that i must choose between all three worlds. Then self-
other utilitarianism says i may choose either , which would maxi-w1
mize the total well-being of everyone, or , which would maximizew 2
the total well-being of everyone excluding i, but not , which wouldw 3
maximize neither. So, in the sense introduced above, dominatesw 2
: is right in a situation where is wrong. But now suppose iw w w3 2 3
has only and to choose from. Now self-other utilitarianism saysw w2 3
both alternatives are right, thereby violating dominance.32
3. Pareto.—My final example of a D-violating theory has not, to my
knowledge, been explicitly proposed by anyone, but it seems in the
neighborhood of views one sometimes finds among economists.
Suppose that, though you are sympathetic to the general utilitarian
approach, you ultimately reject utilitarianism on the specific grounds that
interpersonal comparisons of well-being are meaningless. Nonetheless,
you think utilitarianism gets things right in those exceptional cases
where interpersonal comparisons are not required, namely, those
cases where one alternative is ‘Pareto-superior’ to the rest (i.e., the
alternative would make at least one person better off, and no person
worse off, than any other alternative). Then you might be tempted
by the following view, which I’ll call ‘Paretian utilitarianism’: (1) an
31. Theodore Sider, “Asymmetry and Self-Sacrifice,” Philosophical Studies 70 (1993):
117–32.
32. Douglas W. Portmore has advanced a variant of this sort of view which he calls
“Schefflerian utilitarianism”; see Portmore, “Consequentializing Moral Theories,” 57. This
view, as I understand it, similarly violates D.
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alternative is wrong if it is Pareto-inferior to some other alternative;
(2) otherwise it is right. (Note: this differs from ordinary utilitarian-
ism only in the second clause. Utilitarianism allows that an alternative
may be wrong even when not Pareto-inferior.)
Now consider these alternatives:
Well-being
Worlds i j
w1 2 0
w 2 0 1
w 3 1 0
Suppose first that all three worlds are alternatives. Then Paretian util-
itarianism rules out , because it is Pareto-inferior to , but it per-w w3 1
mits both and . (Perhaps you are tempted to say that is alsow w w1 2 2
clearly worse than , because it’s better to give one person a benefitw1
of two than to give another person a benefit of one. But that argu-
ment rests on an interpersonal comparison of well-being, which we’re
assuming is impossible.) So should dominate , according to D.w w2 3
But then, when the choice is just between and , Paretian utili-w w2 3
tarianism permits both, thereby violating D.
4. Relative value again.—One might try to accommodate such the-
ories within consequentialism by introducing another sort of relative
goodness, though this time relativized to sets of alternatives, rather
than to agents. For example, in the case of satisficing utilitarianism
discussed above, one might say that whether is better than de-w w1 2
pends on what the other alternatives are: in situation 1, where the
only other alternative is , is better than ; but in situation 2,w w w3 1 2
where the only other alternative is , it isn’t. Dominance dependsw 4
on the assumption that the value of an alternative remains constant
between different choice situations. Thus, were we to reject that as-
sumption, we would have to reject D too.
However, since this proposal involves relative goodness, it is vul-
nerable to the same objection that I made above against agent-relative
goodness (Sec. III.B.1). In brief: the most natural way to represent it
formally would be to represent the good by an order of centered
worlds, though this time centered on sets of alternatives, rather than
agents; but that would make consequentialism trivially false, for the
reasons I gave above.
5. Incompleteness again.—I argued above (Sec. III.C.1) that if we
drop the assumption of completeness, we should define maximization
in terms of maximal elements. And I pointed out that, if we did this,
then consequentialism would no longer imply D. However, this would
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.194 on Thu, 16 Jan 2014 09:03:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Brown Consequentialize This 769
not help with consequentializing the D-violating theories discussed
above.
True, each of these theories does maximize (in this sense) at least
one incomplete world order. For example, satisficing utilitarianism
maximizes the order ≤ defined as follows: for all worlds x and y,
iff either (a) , or (b) the total well-being in x is less thanx ≤ y xp y
0.8 times the total well-being in y. However, they also all maximize
more than one incomplete order, given the very innocuous assump-
tion that worlds may differ without differing with respect to people’s
well-being. For example, suppose that and that total well-w ( w1 2
being is the same in and . Then define another order that′w w ≤1 2
is identical to the one above with the exception that and′w ≤ w1 2
. This order is also maximized by satisficing utilitarianism. Ac-′w ≤ w2 1
cording to , and are equally good, whereas according to′≤ w w ≤ ,1 2
they are incommensurable. Thus, the problem, we might say, is that
satisficing utilitarianism gives us no way to distinguish equality and
incommensurability, in some cases.
Indeed, if consequentialism is defined in this way—that is, allow-
ing incompleteness, with maximization defined in terms of maximal
elements—then it implies that there is no equality except in the trivial
sense that every world is equal in value with itself. (For proof, see the
appendix, proposition 3.) This suggests to me that this is not an at-
tractive way to define consequentialism.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
So the project of consequentializing every ethical theory fails. But
what does this show? It might seem unclear whether this failure is
good or bad news for consequentialism. In my view, it’s good.
I’m most confident of this in the case of moral dilemmas. It
seems to me a substantive issue whether moral dilemmas are possible.
That consequentialism takes a side on this issue, denying their pos-
sibility, shows therefore that it has substantive content; it’s not empty
or vacuous. Moreover, it seems to me, consequentialism takes the right
side on this issue. I find moral dilemmas implausible. So this is good
news for consequentialism. It would be worse for consequentialism if
it either took the wrong side, or took no side at all. I’m less confident
that consequentialism is on the right side with respect to other issues
discussed above, for example, agent-relativity. Still, it’s a good feature
of consequentialism, at least pro tanto, that it has substantive impli-
cations in these areas.
I’ll close by drawing out another moral of my conclusion, related
to something Dreier says. Dreier’s motivation for consequentializing is
that he wants to overcome a certain “stigma” which he says afflicts de-
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fenders of “common sense morality” when they try to deny consequen-
tialism.33 To deny consequentialism, he says, they must claim that we
are sometimes required to do less good than we might, but that claim
has a “paradoxical air.”34 So defenders of commonsense morality, who
deny consequentialism, are stigmatized as having a seemingly para-
doxical position. (Note the semantic thesis adopted above provides a
nice explanation of the air of paradox. If the good is, by definition,
the thing which ought to be maximized, then to say that a person
ought not to maximize the good is to say that they ought not to max-
imize the thing they ought to maximize, and that’s obviously para-
doxical.)
Dreier thinks the way to avoid the stigma is to avoid denying
consequentialism. If we consequentialize commonsense morality, then
defenders of commonsense morality need not deny consequentialism.
If I’m right, however, this way of avoiding the stigma doesn’t work;
some elements of commonsense morality—that is, agent-centered-
ness, moral dilemmas, satisficing—prevent its consequentialization.
But there’s a better way to avoid the stigma. Nonconsequentialists
need not accept the paradoxical claim that sometimes we ought not
to maximize the good. Instead, they can claim that there is no such
thing as the good.
Appendix
Proposition 1: R satisfies C iff R satisfies AN, NMD, and D.
Proof. The left-to-right implication is obvious. We prove only the
converse. Suppose R satisfies AN, NMD, and D. We then need only
to show that R maximizes at least one complete world order, because,
as shown in footnote 21, it cannot maximize more than one.
Let i be any agent. And define ≤ by: Wex ≤ y ⇔ y  R ({x, y}).i
need to show that ≤ is a complete order (i.e., transitive and com-
plete), and that for all j and A.R (A)p grt (A)j ≤
Completeness follows immediately from NMD. To prove transitivity,
assume for reductio: , , and ∼ . Since ∼ , thex ≤ y y ≤ z x ≤ z x ≤ z
definition of ≤ implies , and then NMD impliesz  R ({x, z})i
. It follows by D that . But since ,R ({x, z}) p {x} z  R ({x, y, z}) y ≤ zi i
, and so by D, . And since , it fol-z  R ({y, z}) y  R ({x, y, z}) x ≤ yi i
lows by parallel reasoning that . But by definition,x  R ({x, y, z})i
. So , and therefore R doesn’t sat-R ({x, y, z}) P {x, y, z} R ({x, y, z}) pMi i
isfy NMD, violating our assumption.
Now we prove . Since R satisfies AN, it will be suf-R (A)p grt (A)j ≤
ficient to prove . Assume first , it followsR (A)p grt (A) x  R (A)i ≤ i
33. Dreier, “Structures of Normative Theories,” 24.
34. Ibid.
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from D and NMD that, for all , . So, by the defini-y  A x  R ({x, y})i
tion of ≤ , . Next assume . If , thenx  grt (A) x  R (A) x  A x ≤ i
. If , then, by NMD and D, there exists some suchgrt (A) x  A y  A≤
that and , in which case . Therefore,x( y x  R ({x, y}) x  grt (A)i ≤
.R (A)p grt (A)i ≤
Proposition 2: Suppose ≤ is an order of centered worlds and that
R maximizes ≤ ; that is, for all i and A. Then thereR (A)p grt (A)i ≤ ,i
exists some centered world order such that and R maxi-′ ′≤ ≤( ≤
mizes .′≤
Without loss of generality, assume there are only two agents, a and
b. Then define centered world orders ≤ 1 and ≤ 2 as follows:
• if , iff iffip j Ax, i S ≤ Ay, j S Ax, i S ≤ Ay, j S Ax, i S ≤ Ay, j S2
• if and , and ∼ip a jp b Ax, i S ≤ Ay, j S Ax, i S ≤ Ay, j S1 2
• if and , ∼ andip b jp a Ax, i S ≤ Ay, j S Ax, i S ≤ Ay, j S1 2
It is easily seen that if R maximizes ≤ , then R maximizes both ≤1
and . But by construction , so either or .≤ ≤ ( ≤ ≤( ≤ ≤( ≤2 1 2 1 2
Proposition 3: Suppose ≤ is the only world order (complete or
incomplete) that is maximized by R, in the sense that R (A) pi
for all i and A. Then, for all worlds x and y, if , eithermax (A) x( y≤
∼ or ∼ .x ≤ y y ≤ x
Define as follows: iff either (a) or (b) and′ ′≤ x ≤ y xp y x ≤ y
∼ . It follows that for all A, and so if R′y ≤ x max (A) p max (A)≤ ≤
maximizes ≤ , it maximizes . But, by hypothesis, ≤ is the only′≤
order maximized by R, and so . And, by definition, for all x′≤p ≤
and y, if , either ∼ or ∼ .′ ′x( y x ≤ y y ≤ x
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.194 on Thu, 16 Jan 2014 09:03:14 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
